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THE FUTURE OF TORT LITIGATION IN
CALIFORNIA
SANTA CLARA, CALIFORNIA, MARCH 11, 1989
I.
A.

THE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION

103

Essay-The Ramifications of Proposition 103

George Alexander*
The battle over auto insurance rates proved to be the highlight
of tort reform of the recent past. In its resolution, it involved all
branches of state government and the people of the state as well.
Everyone agreed that insurance rates, especially those for
automobiles, were rising at an alarming rate. There was less agreement on the causes of the rate hikes. Spokesmen for the insurance
industry indicated that the higher rates merely reflected higher
costs,' while opponents claimed that the industry was making excessive profits. The insurance industry proposed limitations on litigation
costs both by limiting recoveries for intangible loss and by limiting
attorney fees.2 Some were adopted. The insurance industry also suggested a form of no-fault insurance.' The bar and some consumer
groups proposed both more regulation and less protection of the in© 1989
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1. Navarro, Auto Insurance: Taking the Initiative, 100 & 103, Both Make Insurers
Justify Rate Increase, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 30, 1988, at A18, col. 1.
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1989).
3. Proposition 104, Automobile and Other Insurance.See, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF
STATE, CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET 102 (General Election, Nov. 8, 1988). See also Link,
What Happens if it Passes? The Insurance Industry's Initiative is More Than a No-Fault
Measure, L.A. Daily J., July 25, 1988, at 4, col. 3.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

dustry to curb profits. 4 In a variety of forms, these proposals were
arrayed as initiatives on the ballot in 1988 and Proposition 103 won
by a narrow margin.

5

Proposition 103 had many significant features. It removed the
antitrust exemption of the insurance industry" and subjected future
rates to regulation by an elected commissioner 7 among other things.
Chief among its promoted features, however, was a provision which
cut rates by twenty percent below their level on an earlier date.' The
initiative recited a finding that rates were excessive and that an
across the board cut of twenty percent would result in reasonable
profits." Proposition 103 also provided that the Insurance Commissioner could relieve a company from the rate requirements should
the new rates put them in substantial danger of insolvency' ° (a term
that was not defined).
At the point of the passage of Proposition 103, neither the executive branch (through the power already delegated to the Insurance
Commissioner with respect to rates)" nor the legislature had been
able to achieve "reform" of the system. The initiative procedure provided a well-established process for "the People" to accomplish
change more directly. After the passage of Proposition 103, the last
remaining organ of government had its opportunity. The California
Supreme Court's review of the initiative is the subject of this panel's
discussion.
Although there are many issues surrounding the legality of Proposition 103, it is wise to eliminate the ones which are not in dispute. For example, it is clear that the immunity which the insurance
industry had been given from antitrust enforcement could be revoked; the insurance industry did not bother to challenge that provision. The revocation merely subjects the insurance industry to the
same rules of competition which most other industries face. Whether
4.
5.
1988, at
6.
RETARY

See, e.g., Proposition 104, supra note 3.
Proposition 103 passed by a popular vote of 51%. San Francisco Chron., Nov. 10,
Al, col. 1.
Proposition 103, Insurance Rates, Regulation, Commissioner. See CALIFORNIA SECOF STATE, CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET 98, § 3, at 99 (General Election, Nov. 8,

1988).
7. Proposition 103, supra note 6, §4 at 140. At present, the California Insurance Commissioner is appointed by the Governor. CAL. INS. CODE § 12900 (West 1988).
8. Proposition 103, supra note 6, § 3, at 99.
9. Section 1 of Proposition 103 provides: "Enormous increases in the cost of insurance
have made it both unaffordable and unavailable to millions of Californians." Further, section 2
indicates that the rates set will be "fair." Proposition 103, supra note 6, §§ 1-2, at 99.
10. Proposition 103, supra note 6, § 3, at 99.
11. CAL. INS. CODE § 12900 (West 1988).
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it is wise to remove the exemption (and whether the removal was
accomplished in a proper manner in this initiative), the People are
free to revoke it. One cannot easily argue that it is unconstitutional
for the People to require that the Insurance Commissioner be elected
rather than appointed if they feel that the appointee has not served
consumer ends.
Although arguments can be raised against public rate control of
the industry, they are comparatively tame. Since the midst of the
Great Depression of the thirties, courts have stopped interfering with
public regulation of business on "due process" grounds. 2 There appears to be a uniform condemnation of the period dominated by the
United States Supreme Court's Lochner opinion."3 With very rare
exception, attempts to invoke that "due process theory" have failed
in both the federal and state courts.
There is, however, a viable constitutional provision which bars
confiscation without compensation.' 4 If the rate scheme in Proposition 103 amounted to taking the insurance companies' assets without
compensating for them, it would be unconstitutional beyond cavil.'
The drafters of the initiative no doubt had that in mind when they
provided for the exception in the event that the rate requirements
created substantial threats of insolvency.
The insurance companies claim that Proposition 103 is based
on misinformation and that it would cause confiscatory cutbacks.
They claim that their present rates are justified by their expenses.
The insurance companies also argue that a uniform twenty percent
rate cut could not reasonably reflect appropriate rates, and the new
rates would merely be arbitrarily chosen without a factual basis."
The initiative, on the other hand, made legislative findings that
insurance rates were excessive and that the cutbacks were reasonable. The electorate theoretically adopted those findings when they
12. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
13. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 453-58 (11th ed. 1980) (discussing Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
14. Confiscation without compensation is barred under the "just compensation" clause
of the Fifth Amendment as applied by the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV.

15. The issue can be stated either in terms of "just compensation" or as a matter of
"substantive due process." Both theories lead to a similar analysis. See, e.g., Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591 (1944).

16. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 1-2, Calfarm v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771
P.2d 1247, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989) (No. S007838) (D. Cal. filed Dec. 19, 1988).
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17
enacted the measure.

The real issue that needs to be resolved is whether the rates set
by the initiative are reasonable. If they are, there should not be constitutional impediment to its adoption. Although one can make many
arguments about specific deficiencies in the manner in which Proposition 103 was drafted, the voters should be able to adopt this
measure or another one which achieves the same end. If they are
confiscatory, the law violates constitutional protection.
Resolving the issue of what constitutes fair profits is the hot
potato of the process. In fact, there is considerable disagreement even
on the meaning, interpretation, or calculation of profit data. The insurance code considers the relevant measure of the profitability to be
the "underwriting profit," that is the difference between total expenses, loss payments and other costs, and premiums. 18 The insurance code totally disregards investment income, the profits earned on
premiums in the period between their collection and their use to pay
claims. Investment income is substantial. 9 One begins examination
of the question recognizing that there is even disagreement on its
meaning.
Before Proposition 103, the insurance industry was exempted
from antitrust laws20 so market forces could not be relied upon to set

fair rates. The insurance industry was theoretically subject to administrative review in that the Commissioner of Insurance had authority
to regulate rates which were found to be "excessive, inadequate or
unfairly discriminatory. 2' 1 In fact, the reason for the Proposition
103 provision requiring the Commissioner to be publicly elected was
the belief that the appointed Commissioner was not exercising regulatory power. 2 In fact, in the ten years preceding the suit, only one
rate had been struck down by her office.2"
The legislature held hearings on insurance rates but was unable
to agree on legislative insurance reform. The political balance be17. Real Parties in Interest Brief on the Merits at 7, Calfarm v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal.
3d, 805, 771 P.2d 1247, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989) (No. S007838) (D. Cal. filed Jan. 12,
1989).
18. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.04 (West Supp. 1989).
19. Zonana, Fuzzy Profit Picture Clouds Auto Insurance Measures, L.A. Times, Oct.
30, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
20. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1853, 1853.6 (West 1972). See, e.g., California League of Indep. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857 (D.D.C. 1959).
21.

22.
23.
1989).

CAL. INS. CODE § 1852(a) (West 1972).

Proposition 103, supra note 6 at 98.
Telephone Interview with Joel Laucher, California State Dep't of Ins. (Sept. 15,
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tween the consumer interests and those opposing reform in the legislature tilted in the direction of the latter. A key issue on which there
was no agreement was whether insurance rates were excessive. 2
The framers of several proposed initiatives undertook the reform process. The winning prbposition expressly "found" rates to be
excessive and mandated a roll back, one year rate freeze, and across
the board percentage reduction as a cure. Recognizing the constitutional problem faced, it expressly provided for procedures to adjust
rates after a one year freeze and allowed immediate relief through
the Insurance Commissioner for those companies "substantially
threatened with insolvency" in the interim. The hot potato was thus
thrust back at the Commissioner.
The posture of the case before the California Supreme Court
offers that court the hot potato. While there are numerous technical
issues on which the court could resolve the case,2 5 eventually it can
anticipate having to resolve the question of whether the rate structure in Proposition 103 (or a later version of the same sort) is confiscatory. It can do that in a number of ways. The court can follow the
most frequently adopted practice and dismiss the case until the law
has gone into effect and plaintiffs can show actual rather than anticipated injury, and then judge whether the claimed injury was constitutionally permissible.2 6 The court can evaluate the "legislative findings" that the new structure is fiscally adequate. The court can
evaluate the ability of the Commissioner to give appropriate relief if
rates are otherwise below the constitutionally permissible level. Ultimately, the court is likely to be the final arbiter. Furthermore, with
a majority of the court facing a reconfirmation election in 1990 and
the recent experience of removing justices because of unpopular
stances on a single issue,2 7 it is not without political pressure in
deciding.2"
24. Zonana, supra note 19, at 1.
25. Some of the grounds which Plaintiffs suggested the court could resolve the case
upon, among others, were a violation of the state constitution's express limitation on taxation
and the inseverability of Proposition 103's various provisions, should any be found unconstitutional. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, Calfarm v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771 P.2d
1247, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989) (No. S007838) (D. Cal. filed Dec 19, 1988).
26. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
27. Carlsen, Bird Out, Cranston Wins: Reynoso, Grodin Also Defeated, San Francisco
Chron., Nov. 5, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
28. Since this symposium was held, the California Supreme Court has ruled on Calfarm
v. Duekmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771 P.2d 1247, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989). In its decision, the
Supreme Court passed the "hot potato" back to the Commissioner and to the insurance industry. The court struck the substantial incompetency review as inadequate to protect against
confiscation, announced that the constitution required a fair return on investment, and left it to

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 29

Transcript-The Impact of Proposition 103
1. Introduction-ProfessorGeorge Alexander

Academic panels potentially suffer several problems: topics seem
interesting when the program is planned, and then grow old and
stale as time goes on. Worse yet, issues that seem to be problematic
are resolved; however, those individuals who want to talk about them
still have speeches to make. Expert speakers in the field make appearances and end up agreeing with each other. This results in a
situation of speakers sitting through the panel nodding at each other
while everybody in the audience just nods. At least this much I can
promise about the upcoming panel: you will have none of the above.
The issues involved in Proposition 103 go to the heart of tort reform
as they center on substantive due process, a theory that has rarely
been successfully invoked in recent times. The battle between economic reform and constitutional protection of property rights is certainly not limited to the insurance r'ate reform to be discussed today.
In fact, the current litigation is probably fairly well shaped by a
case decided thirteen years ago, again based on an initiative which
set rent control in Berkeley, the Birkenfeld case."0 The court in that
case stated "It is now settled California law that legislation regulating prices or otherwise restricting contractual or property rights is
within the police power if its operative provisions are reasonably related to the accomplishment of a legitimate governmental purpose.''30
This indicates a very strong anti-interventionist standard in a case
which, as many of you know, resulted in the initiative being declared
unconstitutional. The 103 case will provide an important precedent
to shape reforms of other sorts.
insurance companies to charge whatever rates they consider meet that standard. Since the
rollback and reduction provisions were upheld, insurers risk having to refund excessive charges
with interest. In the meantime, insurers are left to settle with the Commissioner what constitutes a fair return. Calfarm v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771 P.2d 1247, 258 Cal. Rptr.
161 (1989).
29.
(1976).
30.

Birkenfield v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465
Id. at 158, 550 P.2d at 1022, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 486.

We are indebted to Professor George Alexander for moderating this discussion.
**
Partner Cotchett & Illston, Burlingame, CA; Board of Governors of the California
State Bar Association (1972-1975); California Commission on Judicial Performance (19851989); L.L.B., 1964, Hastings College of the Law; lead counsel for the defense in Calfarm
Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian; candidate for Attorney General of the state of California 1989.
*
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PROPOSITION 103
The Panelists' Discussion*
a. Joseph W. Cotchett, Jr.**

As I look out in the audience, I see members of the judiciary,
defense counsel, and plaintiffs' counsel. I do not think, George, that
Proposition 103 really went to the heart of tort reform. While we are
going to talk about Proposition 103 and its impact on California insurance law, if you will, or the tort program, I am not sure that
Proposition 103 really deals with "tort reform." I don't want to get
off on the subject of tort reform, but let me tell you in the bigger
picture how I see 103.
First, let me tell you that during the recent hearing in the
Calfarm case, I represented Harvey Rosenfield, Ralph Nader, and
Voter Revolt. You will hear from the other panelists who they represented, but I had the role of defending the Proposition as written.
This may come as a shock to Ralph sitting here. Was it written
entirely the way we wanted it? Of course not. Could we have drafted
it better? Of course. But the role that I was put in was to stand
there, if you will, with Professor Manheim, and argue logically to
the court that all of the provisions, tied in a bundle, could be held
constitutional.
The insurance industry hired perhaps one of the finest trial
lawyers, not just in the state of California, but in the country. He is
a member of today's panel. I don't consider my good friend, Frank
Rothman, to be a constitutional scholar. Rather, I consider him to be
a very street-wise trial lawyer. The first thing he talked about in
court the other day was the "bait and switch." You won't find that
language in many constitutional cases. But you know what? It
grabbed the attention of a number of supreme court justices. That is
why the insurance industry hired Frank Rothman-he doesn't talk
in legalese about footnote 32 of Permian Basin." Frank talks in
language that people understand, that consumers understand, that
justices of the supreme court understand. Following Frank Rothman's argument that the whole matter should be set aside as unconstitutional, came Attorney General John Van de Kamp's argument.
He did an outstanding job of discussing the will of the People and
the constitutional parameters.
That left us with twenty-two minutes. After fifteen minutes for
Professor Manheim, also representing Voter Revolt, who spoke
about footnote 32 of Permian Basin in a very scholarly way, I was
31.

In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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left with seven minutes to try and rebut everything that Frank Rothman said as to why Proposition 103 was unconstitutional. I tried to
plug holes quickly, because I knew that Justice Kaufman was going
to pounce on me. I had to quickly take the offense and say to the
court: "Wait, stop. If you believe that a portion of Proposition103 is
unconstitutional, take a pen or take a pair of scissors and excise it."
And I could see the smile coming on Frank Rothman's face as I said
that. I said to the court: "Implement the will of the People. Uphold
the entire bundle of insurance (and by the way, this is insurance
reform, as I distinguished from tort reform); let it all stand if you
can. If not, take a pair of scissors and cut out the unconstitutional
parts." I saw clearly, as I am sure many other people did, that the
court was disturbed by certain portions of Proposition 103. I am sure
that Frank Rothman will talk about that when he addresses you.
The bottom line is that Proposition 103 is the tip of the iceberg.
For you people who are here this morning representing the insurance industry, there is more to come. When I say there is more to
come, I mean that even if the court in its wisdom excises certain
portions of Proposition 103, I predict that the public will come back
with a new version. A similar thing happened on the capital punishment issue; the will of the People was such that they kept coming
back with initiatives and with laws until something was actually
done. Bear in mind that the insurance premium bill keeps coming to
your household. That awakens the public.
Somebody asked me the other day: "Is this the most important
case of the decade?" I said: "Well, I don't know that it is the most
important, but certainly, it is something that the public is looking
at." And they said: "Well, what about Proposition 13?" I said Proposition 13 was fine as far as it went, but remember, not everybody
owns a house. Not everybody owns a piece of property. There are
hundreds of thousands of people in California who live in apartments. But they all have something in common. Virtually everyone
in this state gets a bill for an insurance premium. Not everyone gets
a tax bill for real property. But everybody wakes up one morning
and finds a premium notice in the mailbox. So that is the difference
between Proposition 13 and Proposition 103: Proposition 13 excited
the people who owned property, but Proposition 103 excited
everyone.
Frank Rothman made the very astute argument to the court
that the public went into the booth and voted for Proposition 103
only because they wanted to get a quick check back the following
day. Now, Frank compared Proposition 103 to the other propositions
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that went down to defeat, like Proposition 100, and he said that the
only real difference was that Proposition 103 would give the instant
rebate.
I do not think that is a fact. The Los Angeles Times did an exit
poll which showed that one out of every four people voted for Proposition 103 because Ralph Nader supported it. One out of every ten
people voted for Proposition 103 because they felt there ought to be
an elected Insurance Commissioner. Let me tell you that there are
two things the insurance industry fears the most: one is the exemption from the anti-trust laws, which will cause them to open their
books, and the other is the elected Insurance Commissioner.
Let me close by telling you what I see to be the impact of Proposition 103. I see Proposition 103 as a message from the people of
this state saying: "Stop the merry-go-round. We want a fair shake. I
can no longer pay $2000 for insurance on my spouse's second car. I
can no longer pay $2000 for my apartment rental insurance."
I think Proposition 103 has now focused public attention on insurance reform. This will lead to positive tort reform. And if there
are any plaintiffs' lawyers or other lawyers out there who do not
think we need tort reform, they have their heads in the sand. We do
know that there are phony accidents reported on the streets of Los
Angeles. We do know that there are those few members of the medical profession who send phony bills. Good lawyers understand that
the insurance industry is correct in saying that unless we clean up
those problems, premiums are going to rise. It is a fact that we are
going to have to live with. Unless we deal efficiently with the costs of
our tort program, and unless we get to the heart of prevention, as
Ralph was saying, we will not be able to reduce insurance costs over
the long run. It is shocking to hear, for example, that the insurance
industry would not support the 55 mile an hour speed limit. Both
common sense and documented studies show what happens above 55
miles an hour in a collision.
I heard a statistic last night which I think is very significant. In
America today, the wage of the average individual working is 70
times less than the wage of the executive in that same industry. The
executive's salary is 70 times greater than the worker's salary. In
Japan, the same comparison is only 7 times.
How does that relate to Proposition 103? It relates to the big
economic picture that moved the public in the last election. Yes,
Frank, they did vote their pocketbook, but what they said was:
"Somehow, some way, we have to bring a semblance of order, a semblance of balance, because I simply can't afford these premiums any-
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more." And I think when all is said and done, and when the supreme court speaks on Proposition 103, we are going to see a
continued movement over the next few years in California and across
the country. As Ralph said, it is going to move to the east. You can
disagree with many of the things that Ralph or Harvey will say, but
it is a fact that Proposition 103 is going to go across this land, in one
form or another. Whatever the Supreme Court does the message is
that somehow, some way, we are going to have insurance reform and
we are going to have tort reform. The Ivan Boeskys of the world are
not going to be allowed to run wild, with an economic system that
does not allow a person to make reasonable wages and/or to buy
insurance.
I will close with this. We look at insurance as private business,
which it is, but as the Egan,2 case makes clear, it is a business affected with a very real public interest. Because of this, the industry
has been and must be regulated. When you turn on your tap water
in the morning to shave, you know how the rates are set for your
water. When you pick up your telephone and make a long distance
call or a local call, you know how those rates are set because you
have a right to go before the Public Utilities Commission and argue
about them. When you turn on your lights, you know what your
electrical bill will be at the end of the month, and if you do not like
it you have a right to go before the Public Utilities Commission.
In King v. Meese88 our supreme court said that when you leave
this conference today, you cannot leave in a car unless you have insurance. In other words, you cannot turn on the tap, turn on the
electricity, or use your gas, and at the same time you cannot drive
your car, unless you have insurance. My friends, and I say to you
with all due respect, the time has come when insurance companies
have to understand that there must be a form of prior approval on
their rates.
b. Frank Rothman*
I hope, in the few minutes that I have allotted to me, I can
make it clear that I am a lawyer and I am exceedingly proud of
being a lawyer.
32.
(1979).
33.
*

Egan v. Mutual of Omaha, 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482

43 Cal. 3d 1217, 743 P.2d 889, 240 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1987).
Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Los Angeles, CA; Chairman of
the Board and C.E.O. of MGM/UA Communications; L.L.B., 1951, University of Southern
California; lead counsel for the plaintiffs in Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian.
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I am charged with the responsibility of reading the Constitution
of California, the Constitution of the United States, as well as Proposition 103, and attempting to determine whether or not those three
documents can be reconciled. While I think it is quite interesting,
and indeed, important, to discuss sociological issues which Mr. Nader did so well this morning and which Joe just did a few minutes
ago, there are, after all, in this country, a set of rules that we live by,
rules we must live by, and rules which govern the law of the country. I do not know why we would ever conclude, as lawyers or as
people interested in the application of the law, that simply because a
majority of the people, in this case 51%, voted for a proposition that
is automatically insulated with complete and full legality. To me
that is as repugnant to our American way of life as anything could
possibly be. What about the rights of the other 49%? Have we forgotten about that? And suppose, just suppose, that the public were to
decide by a vote perhaps of 51% that indeed, all admissions to law
school should be increased insofar as tuition is concerned, by 20%.
Indeed, there are many people in America who are hungry and that
is a great human tragedy. So will we put an initiative on the ballot
that will require all grocery stores to cut their rates back to what
they were in November of 1987, and then 20% on top of that? We
would say to ourselves, you know, that it may be a good sociological
concept, because people now can afford food, but what about our
Constitution? What about the rights of those people who are affected
by those cuts?
So I say to you this morning, as I hope I said to the supreme
court, there is nothing to be ashamed of when you stand as a lawyer
before a great court and argue the principles of constitutional law.
You need not be ashamed because you are arguing a principle which
seems to have been voted against by an uninformed and non-understanding electorate. On Tuesday, I read to the court a statement
made by another court in California when it was about to examine
the constitutionality of an initiative that had passed. If I read this
very short passage to you, I will then be able to get into Proposition
103 and make some observations about it. The court in that case
said:
It is well to be clear at the outset what this case is and is not
about. First, the issue before the court is one of law, not policy;
it is whether the Act is constitutional, not whether it is necessary or wise

. . .

this case is not about whether the will of the

people shall be heeded. The Act is not the only relevant expres-
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sion of popular sentiment in this case."'
That court understood clearly that we are a government of laws.
Now let us look at Proposition 103. What did it do? The first
thing it said was that all insurance rates, or substantially all, automobile, casualty, property damage, malpractice, were going to be cut
back to rates in November of 1987. And then, just to stick it in a
little bit, we are going to cut another 20%. Why 20%? Nobody
knows. The people who sat down and drafted this, I suppose in some
dark alley some place, could have chosen any percentage and they
chose twenty. So you have to roll rates back down to November of
1987, and then you have got to take off 20%, no matter who you are.
You could be an auto casualty insurer, you could be a property insurer, fire insurer, it did not matter. They did not care. The word is
arbitrary.
The drafters of Proposition 103 then said: "Now that you have
got this tremendous cut, we are going to protect you if you get hurt.
If you get hurt by this in the first year you can come in and ask for
relief. But in order to get relief you have to show that you are
threatened, substantially threatened by insolvency." Well, isn't that
nice? Mr. Cotchett stands up and says we must figure out a way to
see that insurance companies get a fair return on their capital. Now
we find ourselves knocked back twenty-odd percent, and we are told
if we want any relief in that first year, we must show that we are
substantially threatened with insolvency.
Ladies and gentlemen, lawyers, prospective lawyers, the Constitution protects against that kind of conduct. That is a confiscatory
taking. That violates due process of both the California and the federal Constitutions. But I respectfully submit that under any sense of
fairness you might ask yourself what in the world were these drafters thinking about? I want to leave you on this subject with one
thought. There has never been a case cited in the history of American jurisprudence which permitted an arbitrary rate roll-back such
as we have in Proposition 103.
Now, the drafters of Proposition 103 were not satisfied. They
had not stuck it to the insurance companies enough yet. So they said
"Any policies that you have in effect must always be renewed. They
can never be cancelled." The drafters then set forth some reasons for
why you could cancel, but essentially the policies are permanent.
The drafters went one step further. "We have cut you back; we have
34. People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 316, 322, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 640, 642 (1986).
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ripped you apart; we have given you this insolvency standard; you
cannot cancel. Now when a good driver applies for insurance, (anybody who has had only one ticket in three years) his or her rate must
be 20% lower than anybody else."
In the Constitution of the United States and in California there
is a provision which protects us against the impairment of contracts.
The insurance companies wrote policies prior to the enactment of
Proposition 103 which said that you are insured for a period of time,
either six months or one year. Under California law, at the end of
that period, either six months or a year, the insurance companies
had the right, if they chose, not to insure you again. That was their
decision. Now the companies are told under Proposition 103, despite
the fact that you entered into those policies under those considerations, that they do not count anymore. You are stuck with those policies. Forever! We respectfully argued to the supreme court that that
was an impairment of our contract right. It is the equivalent of you
sitting down today and entering into a contract in which you employ
me for six months. I agree to work for you for six months and then
tomorrow a law is passed that says you must employ me for one
year. It cannot be done.
Now, after all of these things happened, and all of these things
were pointed out in various briefs, lawyers on the other side said
"Well, maybe this was drafted too hastily. Maybe the people who
drafted it were not lawyers. Maybe the people who drafted it got a
little overtaken with their zeal and things like insolvency were
wrong. So why don't we just knock out all the bad parts and save the
good parts. In law, this is severability." I suppose that has some kind
of surface interest.
I am not going to discuss with you the provisions of Proposition
103 that deal with taxation or the provisions of 103 that deal with
the creation of a private corporation and their effect on severability.
But what I will say to you is this, and I would like to leave on this
note. It is sometimes helpful to step back and say: "Well now, what
do we have here?" And if there is any fair-mindedness in the world,
you will all say: "I am convinced that Proposition 103 was presented
to the voters of California as a proposition which would return to
you 20% on your insurance. That is why people accepted Proposition 103." The pages and pages of Proposition 103 dealing with antitrust exemptions, dealing with banks going into the insurance business, dealing with rebates being allowed, repealing fifteen sections of
the previous code were not understood by the average voters. I suspect many of you very sophisticated people do not even know what I
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am talking about.
The fact is, the People went to the polls and voted for 103 because they wanted that rebate. And if those 51% now find out that
the rebate is unconstitutional, it is fair, I believe, to conclude that
nobody knows what would have happened to the balance of that initiative. It should not be severed.
While I do not want to infringe on anybody else's time here, I
did use the expression "bait and switch" before the court. I used it
because I was very concerned about the problem. You should be too.
The problem is our initiative process, which leads to this kind of a
situation. Someone with bad motives can put on the ballot, by way of
initiative, a bill that provides that all schools in California shall be
free, knowing full well that that might be unconstitutional. Then he
or she may slip many other things in small print onto the ballot.
When the People pass it because they are so interested in free
schools, and the court rules that the free school provision is unconstitutional, their answer is: "Save everything else. Sever it." That is a
bait and switch. It does not serve us well to have that kind of a
initiative process.
And so I say, in conclusion, while I do not mean to suggest that
I speak to an audience who is happy about losing rebates, you will
be far better off when the Constitution of this state is carried forward in the manner in which it was intended.
c. Assistant Attorney General Michael Strumwasser*
I am Michael Strumwasser, however, at the moment you may
wish to think of me as Rod Serling. I am the fellow who comes on at
the end of an episode of the "Twilight Zone" to tell you that everything you just heard was fiction, to reassure you that gravity does,
indeed, pull down, that the sky is up, and that the People can, in
fact, adopt insurance reform.
Now I do not propose to respond in detail to each of the comments of the other panelists, but several things that Mr. Rothman
said require a response. In doing so, I hasten to add that I have great
admiration for Mr. Rothman, who is not only a superb lawyer but
also a man of principle who is concerned about many of the same
issues that trouble us all.
First, he suggested that somehow, in the process of briefing and
* Special Assistant to California Attorney General John Van de Kamp, advising on a
wide range of regulatory, environmental and tort reform issues; J.D., 1973, University of
California, Los Angeles.
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argument, the proponents of Proposition 103 and the Attorney General conceded that portions of the initiative are unconstitutional.
That is simply not true. Attorney General Van de Kamp said unambiguously to the supreme court that the entire initiative, every provision of Proposition 103, can and should be upheld.
The other statement by Mr. Rothman that I wanted to respond
to is his description of the voters as an "uninformed, non-understanding electorate." On the contrary, the electorate was well informed, and knew exactly what it was doing.
If you begin with the assumption that the electorate was misinformed, you may claim support for that proposition from the inherent sparseness of any initiative and its supporting documentation.
Fortunately, that is not where you begin constitutional analysis of an
initiative. You begin with the presumption that the initiative is not
only constitutional, but that it is based on findings by the voters of
every fact necessary to uphold the legislation. Only if there is no
conceivable set of facts that would justify the initiative's provisions
could the court disregard the voters' findings.
The fundamental finding of the voters was that the insurance
,industry had been lavished with special interest laws that left the
companies unregulated, Isheltered from competition, and protected
from the grievances of their customers, customers who sometimes
were delivered to the companies by the law itself. The voters found
that this legal environment had created a hothouse of inefficiency and
that rates were at least twenty percent higher than they would have
been in a regulated, competitive environment.
Therefore, they adopted the reform that follows logically from
that finding. To prevent anticipatory rate increases during the campaign, they rolled rates back to November 1987 levels. Then, to correct for the deficiencies of the legal environment, they reduced rates
twenty percent for one year. In effect, they were putting insurance
companies on a one year diet to shed their accumulated fat. After the
year, the public provided a strong system of rate regulation, in which
the companies are prohibited from charging rates that are excessive,
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. However, to make sure that
the insurance companies can make it to that promised land, the voters wisely provided in the interim that any company substantially
threatened with insolvency could obtain relief from the Insurance
Commissioner.
Manifestly, the court could not find that there is no conceivable
set of facts to support the people's findings. However, the Attorney
General did not want to leave that to chance, so we provided the
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court with evidence, in the form of a declaration by J. Robert
Hunter, Federal Insurance Administrator under two presidential administrations, demonstrating that the People were entirely correct in
their finding that rates were excessive by at least that amount and
required a legislative reduction.
Rather than further numb you with the legal issues, I would
like to turn briefly to the question of how Proposition 103 will be
implemented, on the assumption that the initiative is upheld by the
California Supreme Court. In particular, I would like to discuss
what I consider to be the most critical issue in determining whether
Proposition 103 will realize its promise of insurance reform, what I
will call "normative ratemaking."
Around the country, most states regulate insurance rates. Until
Proposition 103, California had been the only industrial state that
did not. In most of those states, the companies have become the masters of regulation. The way they get rate hikes is to show the Insurance Commissioner that they have spent a certain amount of money
and to ask for rates to recover that amount. Their philosophy is:
"We spent it, we are entitled to it." If Proposition 103 is implemented in that spirit, it will become a little more than a vacuum
cleaner to suck dollars from consumers' pockets.
In order to make Proposition 103 work, the Insurance Commissioner must ask the hard questions about the insurance company expenditures. For example, why is it that the average California insurer spends about 32 cents per passenger premium dollar on
administrative overhead while USAA spends only 20 cents and consistently is found by Department of Insurance studies to provide a
high quality of service? Why is it that the Insurance Commissioner,
in her annual survey of selected rates, found that a male driver in his
twenties in Compton can get insurance from Mercury for $1,000,
while Aetna charges the same driver, in the same vehicle, $3,000 for
the same coverage?
Those of you familiar with the demography of Sotithern California may suspect the answer lies in the population characteristics
of Compton. It may be that Aetna simply does not want to sell insurance to the kind of people who live in Compton. If that is true, it
illustrates the wisdom of another of Proposition 103's provisions,
making the Unruh Civil Rights Act applicable to insurance companies for the first time.
Now I must tell you that the concept of normative ratemaking,
of telling insurance companies how much they reasonably should be
spending rather than leaving it to the companies' unfettered discre-

1989]

PROPOSITION 103

tion, will not come easily to the Insurance Commissioner. She comes
from the insurance industry, and she believes that the only people
who know how to run an insurance company are those who run the
companies. That is a common reaction to the intrusion by outsiders
into an area of claimed expertise. Ralph Nader spoke of that phenomenon earlier, the reaction of manufacturers and doctors to having
lawyers interrogate them on their business. It is more than just a
question of dollars; it is a cultural barrier to reform.
But in the implementation of insurance reform, the insider philosophy of deference to the judgment of the company is simply at
odds with the fundamental philosophy of Proposition 103.
Now in the remaining few minutes I would like to address the
other topic on the conference's agenda, tort reform. The unspoken
assumption of this conference is that Proposition 103 may represent,
in some cases, a model for tort reform just as it has been a model for
insurance reform. I would like to explicitly address that assumption,
and to do so with a hypothetical. "Hypothetical" is the kind of word
a bureaucrat uses when he is attempting to achieve deniability.
So let us hypothetically consider application of Proposition 103
to the most frequently addressed topic of tort reform, attorney's fees.
We learned last year during the campaign that a plaintiff's attorney
gets forty percent of any recovery. So let's roll that back to November 1987 levels. Forty percent. Now, let's reduce that level by twenty
percent. Twenty percent of forty percent is eight percent, so we
would roll contingency fees back to thirty-two percent. Interestingly,
that is within one and a third percent of a figure Ralph Nader told
you should be the maximum contingency fee that should be
permitted.
During the first year of this rollback, lawyers would be excused
if they could persuade the judge that they were substantially
threatened with insolvency. And, after the first year, a lawyer dissatisfied with a fee could seek to have it changed if he or she thought
the resulting figure was excessive, inadequate, or unfairly
discriminatory.
Obviously, not many plaintiffs' lawyers are going to complain
that their rates are excessive. They could complain that their rates
are inadequate, and the court could rule upon that claim. What
about "unfairly discriminatory?" How would that work?
Well, in every lawsuit, there will be at least two lawyers. If the
thirty-two percent contingency fee produced a sum that was less than
the defendant's attorney collected, for a fee that did not depend on
the outcome of the case, the plaintiff's attorney would have a good
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claim that his or her rate was discriminatory. That is the point that
all fee-limitation bills, all attorney's fees initiatives ignore. But without recognition of the important relationship between plaintiff's and
defendant's attorney's fees, such legislation will amount to little more
than unilateral disarmament for accident victims.
So there you have it, Proposition 103 as a model for tort reform.
If you like it, you are welcome to it. But just remember, you did not
hear it here.
d. Justice Otto Kaus*
I shall state my bias and interest at the outset. My firm, although I myself am only tangentially involved, represents the Automobile Club of Southern California, which has filed an action in
superior court attacking Proposition 103. However, whatever I say
here today represents my own views and not necessarily those of my
client. In any event, I really do not want to talk about the issue that
is shaking up everybody, whether or not Proposition 103 or parts
thereof are unconstitutional. However, I do want to use Proposition
103 as a case study in the defects of the initiative process.
As you all know, California has been in the grip of initiatives,
most of them launched by what I would call the populist right, such
as Proposition 13, Proposition 8, and the Gann spending limit. Some
initiatives coming from the same direction never made it to the ballot
such as the Sebastiani Reapportionment Initiative or the so-called
"Balanced Budget" initiative. One that did make it to the ballot was
the most pernicious of all; it would have cut the pension of retired
judges. We beat that one. Then there were two AIDS initiatives
launched by Lyndon Larouche, both of which were defeated.
I would like to look at Proposition 103 from points of view
which seem to be peculiar to the initiative process. First, the ex parte
nature of the proceeding and second, the number of uncertainties,
almost deliberate uncertainties. Lastly, I would like to expose the
myth that Proposition 103, or that indeed any initiative, represents
the will of the People. That does not mean it is not legal. I am
perfectly willing to play by the rules of the game. But the idea that
Proposition 103 represents the considered will of the People just does
not hold up under scrutiny.
* Partner, Hufstedler, Miller, Kaus & Beardsley, Los Angeles, CA; Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of California 1981-1985; Justice of the Second District Court of Appeal
1964-1981; Judge of the Superior Court for Los Angeles County 1961-1964; L.L.B., 1949,
Loyola Marymount University, School of Law.
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First, consider the ex parte nature of an initiative. Obviously if
a private citizen, such as Mr. Nader or Mr. Rosenfield, launches an
initiative effort like Proposition 103, the insurance industry, which is
the target so to speak, does not get an opportunity to present its case
to the authors. I dare say, even if it were given an opportunity, it
would not take it. Now, if a proposed law were before the Legislature, at least the industry would get a hearing. Naturally, it would
not prevail on all points, but it would be able to make certain points
which might ameliorate the legislation or at least make it workable.
With respect to Proposition 103, if the insurers had cooperated
in the drafting and seen the handwriting on the wall, I think they
might have said to the proponents: "All right, if you are going to
make the driving safety record of an individual the criterion for the
premium that he or she is charged, then will you please put in some
provisions as to how we can find out about that driving record."
Keep in mind that the insured under an automobile policy is not
necessarily the owner of the car. Under the omnibus clause, which is
mandatory for every automobile policy, in a home with four teenage
sons, the insured is each one of the four teenage sons.
The same problems will arise with respect to the good driver
discount. How do we find out what the record of a particular person
is so that he may be entitled to that discount? Incidentally, I have
heard estimates that about 85% of the drivers in California may
qualify for that discount. How do we determine whether a person
has become a worse risk than he was when he originally applied for
and received a policy, so that we can cancel him, permissibly, even
under Proposition 103? We have no subpoena power with respect to
the insured and we depend on the good faith and cooperation of the
insureds in letting us have that information.
If the insurance industry had helped draft this statute, it would
have had something to say about section 1861.10, which says that
any person may initiate or intervene in any proceeding permitted or
established by Proposition 103, challenge any action of the Commissioner, and enforce any provision of this article. 5 Does that make
everybody a cop?
I dare say that it is just bad writing, but the insurance industry
could have conveyed the experience it had, for example, with the
Cumis"6 case. It is an innocent enough case, which says that when an
35. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.10 (West 1989).
36. San Diego Navy Fed. Credit U. v. Cumis Ins., 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (1984).
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insured is sued on two causes of action, one of which is covered, one
of which is not covered, then the insurance company must pay independent counsel to represent the insured so that the attorney hired
by the insurance company cannot steer the plaintiff in the direction
of the uninsured cause of action."7 That is all very well and good,
but there has been incredible abuse. Section 1861.10 is an invitation,
it seems to me, to unscrupulous people to make a fast buck for themselves, rather than achieve something worthwhile for the public.
Now, about the uncertainties. Having been on the bench for
twenty-four years, I have struggled with my share of poorly worded
legislation, but the disease seems to be particularly virulent in the
case of initiatives. I have run into the death penalty initiative with
typographical errors and cross-references to wrong sections. Proposition 8 had one goof which luckily was so obvious that one could
easily correct it because one knew what the authors meant to say. It
had another possible goof which was not nearly so obvious. In step
with that tradition, Proposition 103 reads to me like a first draft of a
statute that you have after a meeting when you have decided what
you want to achieve. So many terms are not defined that it reaches
the point where the uncertainty becomes overwhelming.
What is the meaning of the phrase "substantially threatened
with insolvency"? What are "similarly situated risks," a phrase that
applies to new business when you do not know what to charge them
by way of rates? What is a "moving violation"? Is it the same as the
violations listed in Insurance Code section 11828(3)C(2)? Who
knows? But whether or not you have been convicted of more than
one moving violation in the last three years determines, in part,
whether or not you get your 20% good driver discount. Proposition
103 says that while applications for increased rates may be made
before November 8, 1989, the Commissioner may not approve them
until then. Can she signal approval? If the approval of the new rate
is not announced until November 8, 1989, you cannot put it into
effect, I am told, for about six weeks. So that should have been clarified and probably would have been if the industry had been consulted. I personally believe it means that you can announce it, but
that it does not go into effect. Why not say so? What is a "substantial increase in the hazard," another phrase in Proposition 103?
Rate review, starting in November of this year, must result in rates
which are neither excessive or inadequate. That is like being not too
good or not too bad. What does it really mean?
37.

Id. at 361, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
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Finally, and this seems to me to be schizophrenic, in the area of
rating classifications, the Unruh Act, 8 and Proposition 103 simply
cannot co-exist. Please understand I have absolutely nothing against
making the Unruh Act applicable to practices such as red-lining.
However, insurance rates are based on actuarial predictions. Proposition 103 tells us that in rate setting the insured's driving safety
record is to be paramount. All right, fine. We have discussed the
problems of finding out about the insured's driving safety record. But
let's assume that we can do it. You are still going to have a premium
for that particular group into which the insured belongs, good drivers, bad drivers, medium drivers, and so on. You cannot have a different premium for every insured. Yet the Unruh Act is based upon
the proposition that each living human being is an individual. A
landlord cannot forbid Adam Wolfson from living in the Marina
Point apartment complex because he belongs to a class which is actuarially a damn nuisance in an apartment building, namely, kids.
You have to look at the particular child. This kind of individualized
treatment is simply impossible in setting insurance premiums.
Actually, today in California we have permitted discrimination
in rate setting. For example, Insurance Code section 11628, the socalled Rosenthal-Robbins Auto Insurance Non-Discrimination Law,
does not prohibit premium discrimination in automobile insurance
based on sex. The Rosenthal Law also allows discrimination between localities; it just does not permit discrimination within a locality, a very carefully defined concept. Finally, it allows differential
rates for handicapped drivers if there is actuarial evidence to support
the differential. Query whether you can get away with any of that
under the Unruh Act.
The problems of reconciliation between the Unruh Act as it applies to rating and the powers of the Commissioner under Proposition 103 and existing statutes are going to be enormous. I have to
believe that the Legislature would have been more careful. Again I
submit that the process of legislating through initiative has certain
inherent defects, which unfortunately have not been avoided.
Finally, I believe that the "will of the People" argument is
much more of a myth in the field of initiatives than the "will or
intent of the Legislature" argument is in the area of statutes. I understand the latter is also, to some extent, mythical. But at least you
have, if not legislators, trained staff members going over these things,
knowing what they are doing and telling the boss: "That's all right,
38.

CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 51 (West Supp. 1987).
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Senator, you can vote for that."
Let me ask you a few questions. As people emerged from the
voting booth last November, was it their will that Government Code
section 6254(d) not be applied to Proposition 103? Probably not, because Government Code section 6254(d) is not anywhere in Proposition 103, not even in one of the repealed sections. The voter would
have had to find a set of statutes to find out what he was not making
applicable. Was it really the People's intent to repeal Article 5 of the
Insurance Code relating to unlawful rebates? Here you could at
least say that they had the repealed law right in front of them. In
fact, they had pages and pages of material that were hyphened out, if
they could read it. I had to enlarge my copy of Proposition 103 in
order to read what we repealed in November.
Was it really the People's intent that the Commissioner was to
accept, amend, or reject rating decisions only under the provisions of
sections 11517(a) and (e) of the Government Code? They were not
told what was in those sections. Subsection (e) doesn't even apply to
accepting, amending, or rejecting decisions; it applies to publishing
them.
Was it the will of the People that section 11513.5 of the Government Code apply to the Commissioner? That section which
makes a lot of sense, because it puts upon an administrative law
judge the same duties of confidentiality as those on a real judge.
However, when the Insurance Commissioner acts as an agent in administrative proceedings, she just isn't a judge. She is an administrative agent subject to all of the restraints and possessed of all the freedoms of a member of the executive. If you look at section 11513.5
very carefully, you will see certain concepts which simply cannot be
applied to a Commissioner of Insurance.
Was it the will of the People that judicial review be in accordance with section 1858.6 of the Insurance Code? That section was
certainly not before the People. I had to look it up. It provides for
what amounts to a trial de novo on the record in the superior court,
which has full power to make fact findings even though there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner and the
administrative law judge. Just think what this is going to do to rate
applications which are displeasing to somebody; either the insurance
company, the corporation that is to be formed, or to any one of the
25 million ombudspersons that have been created by Proposition
103.
Was it the will of the People that Proposition 103 not apply to
lines of insurance listed in section 1851? Section 1851 was not before
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the People. Sure, if you want to know what lines of insurance it does
not apply to, you can look it up, but how many voters did?
When professionals, however defective their aims, goals and
methods may be, get down to the job of legislating they at least bring
a certain amount of technical expertise to the process. If Proposition
103 does nothing else than to spur a movement to improve the process of legislating by initiative, it will have served a very worthwhile
purpose.
e.

Panel Discussion

Joseph W. Cotchett, Jr.
Justice Kaus said to you: "They didn't have a chance to present
their case. They spent $70 million presenting their case and lost it."
He also said that the anti-trust laws applying the unfair business
practices to insurance companies is like apply anti-trust laws to
OPEC? However, a federal court has just said in Philadelphia that
the only reason we can't apply antitrust laws to OPEC is because we
can't get jurisdiction over them. "And I question that," so said that
judge, "because I think if they do business here we can get jurisdiction over them." And there are 600 insurance companies that do
business in California and the anti-trust laws can apply to them as
well.
Frank Rothman
It is interesting to listen to the great jury lawyers, and those
who are, I suspect, embarking on political campaigns, to quickly forget that we still have obligations to the law. Now, it does not make
any sense to talk about the will of the People for this, or the will of
the People for that. We have here a statute. It has four corners to it.
As the Attorney General and everybody on the other side has been
saying, they're all functionally inter-related. One is related to the
other. And they're now asking the court to take out a red pencil, a
blue pencil, a green pencil and five or six erasers and try to rewrite
this mess. Lawyers do not talk that way.
Now we have been threatened this morning. When this court
finds this to be unconstitutional, Mr. Cotchett says, we will get another initiative. Well that is fine. But let's learn from this one. Let
me leave you with one last thought. In the Berkeley case that was
decided by the supreme court which was alluded to this morning,
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Birkenfeld"9 is its name, the court found that rent control initiative
to be unconstitutional. It refused to sever any provisions and knocked
out the entire statute. Then the voters went back and created a new
rent control initiative, but they did it right. They learned from
Birkenfeld. Then the supreme court in Fisher,0 the follow-up case,
said now we hold the statute to be constitutional because every vice
we found in Birkenfeld has now been corrected. The law has been
satisfied.' 1 And so Mr. Rosenfeld, wherever you are, and you drafters, wherever you are, listen carefully, learn, and if you are coming
back a second time, do it right. Thank you.
Justice Otto Kaus
I am sorry I was obviously quite misunderstood. I never said
that Proposition 103 was unconstitutional, certainly not for the reasons that I brought up. I simply talked about Proposition 103 as a
statute which could have been much, much better if it had not been
the product of the initiative process but had gone through the regular
professional legislative process. There the "victim," the insurance
company, would have been permitted to have a say. Even though the
industry could not have swayed the proponents of the statute from
their main goal, it could have corrected certain obvious deficiencies
and uncertainties. Then, I simply directed myself to the proposition
that the "will of the People" argument is somewhat fictitious, and
even more fictitious in the area of initiatives than it is in the area of
representative legislation. That does not mean that I am not willing
to abide by the rules of the game that we live by. If an initiative
passes by one vote, and all the people who voted in favor of it were
dead drunk when they went to the polls, that's the way it goes.
Thank you.

39. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465
(1976)
40. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682
(1984).
41. Id. at 690, 693 P.2d at 297, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 718.

